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Trouble on the High “C’s” – China, Cyber, 
and the Trading System1 
Robert Fisher2 
 
Commenting on the first great era of globalization, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that 
“the vast increase in the rapidity of communication has multiplied and strengthened the bonds 
knitting the interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated system, not 
only of prodigious size and activity, but of an excessive sensitiveness…National nerves are 
exasperated by the delicacy of financial situations and national resistance to hardship is sapped.”3  
Mahan worried over the impact of commercial and economic dependencies that developed as new 
forms of transportation and communications (e.g. steam-powered shipping, rail, and global cable 
communications) spurred a growth surge in global trade and finance that, while improving 
standards of living and enriching nations also created new vulnerabilities as nations became less 
self-sufficient. 
Mahan’s thoughts are as applicable today as they were over a century ago.  For the past 70 
years, the United States and Europe (later joined by allies in Asia), have pressed to rebuild and 
extend trade and financial relationships torn apart by World Wars I and II and the Great 
Depression.  A key achievement in those efforts was the creation of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the framework governing 
much of international trade.  The GATT (1948), extended via the WTO (1994), established a set 
of rules to promote free and fair trade (generally based on free market principles of economists 
                                                 
1 Please cite as: Fisher, Robert, “Trouble on the High “C’s” – China, Cyber, and the Trading System,” in Demchak, 
Chris C. and Benjamin Schechter, eds. Military Cyber Affairs: Systemic Cyber Defense 3, no. 2 (2018). 
2 Hills & Company, International Consultants. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily 
reflect those of Hills & Company or its clients. 
3 Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” in Retrospect and Prospect, 
Studies in International Relation Naval and Political, London, 1902, p. 144 found here: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=MvpNAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA137&lpg=PA137&dq=alfred+thayer+mahan+Cons
iderations+governing+the+dispositions+of+navies&source=bl&ots=xvxgFfGdie&sig=qInZPn6DxOTtizgRWZgvAs
LVuYA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiAp9aIypHaAhVBNd8KHSKlByMQ6AEIPjAF#v=onepage&q=alfred%20t
hayer%20mahan%20Considerations%20governing%20the%20dispositions%20of%20navies&f=false  
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like Adam Smith and David Ricardo), a forum for the progressive elimination of trade barriers 
(first in mining and manufactured goods, but now extended to agriculture, services, and intellectual 
property, and a mechanism that when created was believed to provide a fairly swift and sure means 
to enforce trade commitments.   
For the first fifty years of the revitalized trading system, it generally was smooth sailing.  
While there were the inevitable trade disputes, the system functioned well under the overall 
leadership of the “Quad” countries – the United States, EU, Japan, and Canada.  Important trade 
issues often were first discussed among the Quad, and consensus (or near consensus) was reached 
before the results were multilateralized out to other GATT/WTO members for review, amendment, 
and adoption.  For many GATT/WTO members, that process worked well, since little was 
expected from them in terms of ongoing trade liberalization commitments as long as they did not 
obstruct what the Quad was trying to do. 
Under the GATT/WTO, world trade grew substantially, boosting global gross domestic 
product (GDP).  From 1960 to 2000, global GDP grew from US$1.37 trillion to US$33.6 trillion 
(24.5 times).4  During that same period, global exports of goods and services spiked from 
US$157.1 billion to US$7.9 trillion (50.2 times).5 
The single largest economy in this system and its principal driver was the United States.  
Beyond the wealth creation and economic benefits, at its core, the system leveraged U.S. power.  
Washington led the system and was the prime mover behind progressive global trade liberalization.  
And it did so by negotiating with close allies who shared common beliefs in the underlying 
principles of the trading system and who more or less operated on the same basic market principles 
as the United States.   
But as the 20th Century closed, two new and sometimes mutually reinforcing disrupters 
emerged whose combined impact raises questions about whether the basic operating principles of 
the postwar system still are warranted and, if so, how that system might adapt to the challenges 
posed by these agents. 
                                                 
4 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 1960 is the earliest year available in the World Bank data 
set for these figures. 
5 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ne.exp.gnfs.cd 
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They were China and cyber. 
China grew into an increasingly important market, competitor, and supplier in global trade.  
Cyber6 became one of the great levelers for production and trade, fueling expansive growth of 
supply chain networks, outsourced production and services, and increased trade in cyber hardware 
and services.  And the two interacted, with cyber both helping to fuel China’s export-led growth 
and to become a sector that that China determined essential to its future, both economically and 
strategically, and so set out state-directed plans to achieve dominance in that area, oftentimes 
through policies that appear unfair or predatory. 
China 
In December 2001, after 15 years of negotiations, China joined the WTO.  In its accession, 
China made significant commitments to market access, national treatment, IPR protection, 
transparency, domestic subsidies reduction, among others, to bring its domestic trade and 
regulatory regime into conformity with its WTO obligations.7  There was a hope and expectation 
that bringing China into the WTO would further the internal reform process within China which, 
under the leadership at the time, seemed to be moving toward a more market-oriented economy, 
reducing China’s impact as a disruptive non-market force in a market-drive global economy.8 
China did undertake many reforms consistent with its WTO obligations and swiftly rose in 
importance as a trading nation.  Its share of global merchandise exports soared from 4.3 percent in 
2001 to 13.1 percent in 2016 ($243 billion to $2.1 trillion)9 (See Figure 1).  China’s merchandise 
                                                 
6 For purposes of this paper, “cyber” means information and communications hardware, software and services and 
all things related to computers and computer networks 
7 USTR, 2003 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE, December 11, 2003, p. 3 
8 “For China’s leadership, these commitments were primarily intended to consolidate and accelerate the market-
oriented reforms responsible for lifting 300 million Chinese citizens out of poverty over the past 25 years. China 
also viewed joining the WTO as a means to ensure its continued access to export markets. In turn, other WTO 
members envisioned that faithful WTO implementation by China would reduce the ability of non-market forces, 
including government policies and officials, to intervene in the market to direct or restrain trade flows.”  ibid, p. 3-4 
9 WTO Statistical Database, http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBViewData.aspx?Language=E, World and 
China total merchandise exports and imports, 1960-2016.  For reference, China’s share of global merchandise 
exports grew slowly from 1960 (2 percent) to 2000 (3.8 percent). 
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exports to the United States grew from US$102.3 billion in 2001 to $505 billion in 2017, with the 
trade deficit growing from -$83.1 billion to -$375.2 billion over that same period.10 
Figure 1:  China World Merchandise Exports and Imports, 1960-2016 
 
 
To be clear, China’s entry into the WTO did not, at least with respect to the United States, 
eliminate U.S. barriers to trade with China.  The United States had already accorded China 
“normal” (i.e. most-favored-nation) trade status since 1980.  China’s entry did give it the WTO 
imprimatur signaling that it had arrived on the global economic stage and helped reassure traders 
and investors that China’s continued access to foreign markets was assured.  Its WTO entry also 
coincided with a rapid takeoff in China’s exports and an increasing imbalance between those 
exports and China’s imports, leading to the perception that WTO entry was the launching pad for 
China’s export boom. 
Over time it became clear that (1) China was not, at least in U.S. eyes, fully complying 
with its obligations; (2) market-oriented reforms stalled in key sectors, including those related to 
                                                 
10 U.S. Department of the Census, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#1985  
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
3
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
5
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
7
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
4
$
B
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
Year
Exports
Imports
4
Military Cyber Affairs, Vol. 3 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mca/vol3/iss2/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.3.2.1059
  
5 
 
high technology and ICT/cyber, and (3) the WTO system could be challenged in its ability to 
constrain China’s behavior, both for weaknesses in the existing enforcement mechanism and 
policy coverage gaps in WTO disciplines. 
Even more disturbingly, China increasingly was targeting innovative high technology and 
IP-intensive sectors where the United States has tended to dominate.  As USTR noted in its March 
2018 Section 301 report on China’s IP and technology transfer practices, “Official publications of 
the Chinese government and the CCP set out China’s ambitious technology-related industrial 
policies. These policies are driven in large part by China’s goals of dominating its domestic market 
and becoming a global leader in a wide range of technologies, especially advanced technologies.”11  
Among specific Chinese practices challenged are forced technology transfer (including through 
ownership restrictions on investment), cyber-theft of IP and sensitive commercial information, 
discriminatory licensing restrictions, use of outbound investment to target and acquire foreign 
technology, and other measures, including China’s Cybersecurity Law.  
China’s “Made in China 2025 notice, for example, identifies 10 key strategic advanced 
technology manufacturing industries for development and promotion, including, among others, 
advanced information technology, robotics and automated machine tools, and new materials.12 It 
call for China to achieve 40 percent self-sufficiency by 2020 and 70 percent by 2025 in core 
components and critical materials in various industries through import substitution with the goal 
of “becoming a manufacturing superpower that dominates the global market in critical high-tech 
industries.”13  Per USTR, “The “Made in China 2025” Key Area Technology Roadmap (Made in 
China Roadmap) sets explicit market share targets that are to be filled by Chinese producers both 
domestically and globally in dozens of high-tech industries.”14 
                                                 
11 USTR, Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, 
Intellectual Property and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 22, 2018, p. 10. 
12 Other sectors identified include aircraft and aircraft components, maritime vessels and marine engineering 
equipment, advanced rail equipment, new energy vehicles, electrical generation and transmission equipment, 
agricultural machinery and equipment, and pharmaceuticals and advanced medical devices. 
13 Laskai, Lorand, “Why Does Everyone Hate Made in China 2025?, Net Politics blog posting, Council of Foreign 
relations, March 28, 2018, at https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-everyone-hate-made-china-2025  
14 USTR, Final Section 301 report, p. 15. 
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Cyber 
Adapting to China’s emergence as a global trade power was one challenge for the global 
trading system and the United States.  Compounding it was the simultaneous emergence of 
ICT/cyber/high-tech as an increasingly important influencer in its own right on trade and 
investment and as a force multiplier for China. 
Prior to the late 1990s, the cyber world was not on the trade agenda.  During the last major 
multilateral trade round – the Uruguay Round concluded in 1994 – words such as “digital” and “e-
commerce” do not appear once in the 504 pages of negotiated agreements.   
That is not to say the negotiations were totally divorced from cyber.  There were 
negotiations on telecommunications services, but there was no holistic focus on cyber/ICT/high 
technology and their implications for the trading system.   
It was only through the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) that 26 WTO Members 
agreed in 1996 to eliminate tariffs on many high technology products, such as semiconductors, 
software, computers, semiconductor manufacturing and testing equipment, and scientific 
instruments, along with the majority of parts and accessories for these items.  According to the 
WTO, ITA now covers roughly 97 percent of global trade in these IT products.15  
Under ITA liberalization, exports of ITA products more than tripled from 1996 to 2015, 
growing from $549 billion to $1.7 trillion, despite significant price decreases for many of these 
products.16  The shift in market shares of leading exporters was significant and almost all to 
China’s advantage.  In 1996, the EU and the United States respectively accounted for 31 percent 
and 20 percent of ITA exports, with China (including Hong Kong) taking 3 percent.  By 2015, 
China’s share of the $1.7 trillion in exports had grown to 33 percent, with the EU at 16 percent 
and the United States down to 9 percent.17 (Figure 2) 
Figure 2:   Share of World Information Technology Merchandise Exports (%) 
                                                 
15 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itaintro_e.htm A second round of liberalization on additional 
products was concluded in 2015, adding 201 products, such as newer generation semiconductors, semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment, GPS equipment, and certain advanced medical equipment. 
16 WTO, 20 Years of the Information Technology Agreement, p. 25. 
17 Ibid, p. 28. 
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However, cyber’s influence on global trade and investment goes far beyond the hardware 
flows captured under the ITA agreement.  Cyber lowers transaction costs (particularly 
communications and coordination) allowing firms to take advantage of global wage, skill, and 
technology differences far more easily than before.  It now is possible and profitable to globally 
and rapidly transfer or change factors of production (other than land) that yield comparative 
advantage. 
Where the immediate postwar trading system and its rules assumed activity based on 
moving goods from one country to another, the system today is far more complex, involving goods 
(often intermediate parts and components); services (e.g. telecom, internet, express delivery, etc.); 
global investment in factories, training, technology and R&D; and cross-border intellectual 
property (IP) flows, including managerial know-how. 
The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that between 2002 and 2012, global knowledge-
intensive flows (goods, services, and investment activities that have a high R&D component or 
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utilize highly skilled labor) increased from $5 trillion to $13 trillion.18 Cross-border e-commerce 
transactions are estimated to grow from $300 million in 2016 to $1 trillion in 2020, involving some 
940 million on-line shoppers.19  Some 12 percent of global goods trade today is conducted via e-
commerce.20  The growth in the sheer volume of data being transmitted across borders is 
staggering.  As measured by bandwidth used (terabits per second), cross border data flows grew 
45 times from 2005 to 2014 (4.7 terabits per second to 211.3 terabits per second).21  McKinsey 
estimates that cross-border data flows added $2.8 trillion to global GDP in 2014 (higher than the 
contribution from goods trade) both from their direct contribution and their impact on trade in 
goods, investment, and movement of people.22 
Cyber has yielded real benefits to the global economy and the trading system, but it has 
also introduced significant challenges, as well as gaps that have been exploited, fairly and unfairly. 
• At its most basic, cyber forces us to reconsider what comparative advantage means in an 
era where knowledge is key, information can be transmitted anywhere rapidly with 
minimal costs, and the pace of innovation is increasing.  Offshoring and outsourcing 
present challenges to the United States in both manufacturing and services, and particularly 
in knowledge and innovation-driven output, areas where the United States traditionally has 
enjoyed an advantage.  
• Cyber technology vastly increases the scope and speed for predatory practices that steal 
comparative advantage (knowledge, R&D, basic business information), which China has 
used to its benefit.  As USTR notes, “…evidence from U.S. law enforcement and private 
sources indicates that the Chinese government has used cyber intrusions to serve its 
strategic economic objectives. Documented incidents of China’s cyber intrusions against 
U.S. commercial entities align closely with China’s industrial policy objectives. As the 
global economy has increased its dependence on information systems in recent years, cyber 
theft became one of China’s preferred methods of collecting commercial information 
                                                 
18 McKinsey, Global Flows in a Digital Age, April 2014, p. 33. 
19 McKinsey, Digital Globalization:  The newer of global flows, p. 35. 
20 Ibid, p. 7. 
21 Ibid, p. 4. 
22 Ibid., p. 75 
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because of its logistical advantages and plausible deniability.”23 The trading system to date 
has not been adept at addressing this challenge. 
• The expansion and diffusion of global commerce and production and the emergence of 
China as a major nexus in these chains creates a mutual dependency that could be used by 
Beijing to bring pressure to bear on the West or by the United States and other to bring 
pressure on China.  As Olivier Blanchard of the Petersen Institute of International 
Economics recently tweeted, “Global supply chains and trade wars. You are China and 
unhappy about the new tariffs. You identify a few Chinese plants crucial to the supply 
chains of a couple of US firms. You send a hygiene inspector, who finds a rat, and closes 
the plant for a month. You are done.”24  The same could be said in reverse if recipients of 
Chinese-made or assembled products begin stopping shipments at their borders.  Caught in 
the middle are third-country suppliers. 
The Challenge of Entanglement 
Cyber and China mutually reinforced these trends.  Cyber has been an important factor in 
China’s trade growth, both for its direct impact on China’s exports of ICT and high-tech goods 
and its support infrastructure for global supply chains.  It also has opened a new and easier route 
to predatory practices.   
But cyber and China combined have accelerated what may be the greatest challenge for 
addressing the issues these two factors present.  That is the challenge of commercial and economic 
entanglement.  To be clear, that entanglement has led to significant benefits for both sides – 
increased competition, lower consumer costs, greater transparency and information flow, reduced 
barriers to entry for SMEs and others, and reduced global poverty, to name but a few.  But, as with 
undersea cables and steam transportation a century ago, it also has created “new vulnerabilities.” 
Since 2001, the United States and China have become more interlinked in myriad ways.  
U.S. companies often have significant revenue exposure in China.  Among the most severely 
                                                 
23 USTR, Findings, p. 153 
24 https://twitter.com/ojblanchard1?lang=en Tweet dated March 21, 2018. 
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affected are semiconductor firms, with major companies25 having revenue exposure in China 
ranging from 36-83 percent (2014 figures).26  About 57 percent of U.S. soybean exports ($12.3 
billion) were sold to China in 2017; that amounted to roughly 30 percent of total production.27  The 
stock of U.S. foreign direct investment in China has grown from $10.5 billion in 2001 to $92.5 
billion in 2016 (most recent year available).28  And China holds about $1.25 trillion in U.S. 
Treasuries, making it the biggest foreign holder of that debt.29 
For companies, this entanglement places firms doing significant business or having major 
investments in China in a predicament.  Some will publicly support government action to address 
serious concerns.  Others, even if they have serious troubles, may not wish to raise issues for fear 
of retaliation.  Some will not support U.S. government action because they are not directly affected 
by predatory practices but nevertheless fear being caught in the cross-fire of a trade war.  And still 
others not only do not want their own business affected but may hope to profit from market 
openings created if China disfavors certain companies or countries.  The domestic debate over the 
appropriate approach to China on the Section 301 case is but the most recent example of these 
conflicting positions.  And these same considerations can play into the ability of the United States 
(or another affected party) to garner support from international allies. 
 
At the broadest level, cyber/ICT/innovation is an entanglement itself, where the United 
States and China are wrestling over competing economic ideologies and their perceived economic 
futures.  The United States has been the traditional leader in these high-tech activities based on the 
traditional rules of the WTO system and the international economic order.  China is the relative 
newcomer that has identified cyber/ICT/innovation as essential to its development going forward 
                                                 
25 Avago Technologies, Broadcom, Intel, Lam Research, Microchip Technology, Micron Technology, NVIDIA, 
QUALCOMM, Skyworks Solutions, and Texas Instruments). 
26 Quartz, https://qz.com/853032/these-are-the-us-companies-and-states-that-will-suffer-most-if-us-china-relations-
worsen/  
27 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS), 
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx, and Crop Values, 2017 Summary, February 2018, p. 26. 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/current/CropValuSu/CropValuSu-02-23-2018.pdf  
28 USTR, National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 2003 and 2018 reports, pages 46 and 91, 
respectively.  
29 Brad W. Setser, A Few Words on China’s Holdings of U.S. Bonds, Council on Foreign Relations blog post, 
January 17, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds  
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and is doing what it deems necessary, within the confines of a statist system organized to achieve 
its goals via policies that often appear questionable under WTO rules or inimical to free market 
principles.   
Looking Forward 
Does the combination of cyber and China introduce ungovernable instabilities or 
vulnerabilities that require us to rethink the basic premises of the trading system?  Or are there 
ways to think about addressing existing concerns without starting over so that we accommodate 
these two change agents while reducing the tensions they individually and together have 
introduced into the trading system. 
In looking at this set of questions, the starting point for this paper is two basic assumptions: 
• The postwar trading system, while at times flawed and inefficient, is worth preserving:  Thanks 
to the GATT/WTO framework and disciplines, the world’s $20.2 trillion in exports of goods 
and commercial services30 (including those impacted by ICT/cyber) generally takes place 
without great difficulty.  For cross border flows where there are no real trade issues, or where 
the issues fall within the traditional bucket of WTO coverage and concerns (e.g. market access 
for goods, dumping, subsidies, safeguards, etc.) the system generally works well in providing 
a common set of rules of the road for engaging in trade relationships.  There is no reason to 
abandon this system or its underlying precepts. 
• The trading system has proven it can adapt when needed.  For its first 46 years, the GATT 
largely focused on manufactured goods.  There were few attempts to deal with agricultural 
issues, and none for services and intellectual property.  There was no mandatory dispute 
settlement process.  That changed when GATT members updated the GATT and created the 
WTO, bringing these and other issues under fresh trade disciplines needed to reflect the 
importance of these new activities to the global economy.  Given the political will, it can do 
the same again to address the digital age.  There already are examples in bilateral or plurilateral 
trade negotiations, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Trade 
                                                 
30 WTO, World Trade Statistical Review, 2017, Tables A-4 and A-8 
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Partnership31 (CPTTP), where governments are incorporating provisions on digital issues and 
e-commerce. 
• China is too important to be left out of the system.  For economic, political, and strategic 
reasons, China should be part of the trading system, not simply as a trading nation but as a 
WTO member bound by its obligations.  Virtually every country already is a WTO member or 
is in the process of joining.32  While there are genuine questions and challenges to having China 
in the WTO, the reality is that its importance today is such that it should not be left out.  Indeed, 
its economic power and political importance are such that were it not in the WTO, it could and 
would seek to create institutions and means of influence over global trade that are more to its 
liking and where it controls the balance of power.  Indeed, through efforts such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and its 
Belt and Road Initiative, China already has shown it can and will pursue its own path.   
Within that framework, there is a set of options that should be considered. 
• Trade:  The combination of China and cyber present challenges to which the trading 
system must adapt.  Specifically: 
o Update WTO Rules on Cyber and State-Directed Economic Policies:   New WTO 
rules are needed to update WTO disciplines for the cyber era (e.g. cross border data 
flows, e-commerce, and data privacy); and to address unfair government economic 
intervention (e.g., state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, cyber-theft 
of IP, competition policy, etc.).  The CPTTP provisions dealing with these issues 
may provide useful guidance. 
o Strengthen WTO Dispute Settlement and Enhance its Commercial Relevance: 
WTO dispute settlement should be fixed so that it is timely.  There also should be 
greater incentives for companies to support dispute settlement cases.  WTO 
remedies today are designed to stop current unfair practices and prevent them from 
reoccurring in the future.  They do not look backward and compensate injured 
parties.  Additional remedies might be considered, such as financial compensation 
                                                 
31 Formerly the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from which the United States withdrew in January 2017. 
32 The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea is one exception. 
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paid to an injured government that might in turn then be used to directly or 
indirectly compensate affected producers.    
o Restrict Unfairly Developed and Trade Products:   Current U.S. law33 provides for 
the possibility of cease and desist orders and product exclusions against imports in 
cases where IP infringement occurs in those imports, or where other unfair methods 
of competition and actions and unfair acts threaten to substantially injure a U.S. 
industry, prevents an industry’s establishment or restrains or monopolizes trade in 
the United States.  Greater use could be made of this provision by U.S. firms, and 
U.S. allies might enforce similar bans once issued by an affected jurisdiction. 
o Negotiate New Trade Agreements and Update Existing FTAs to Ensure Coverage 
of Cyber and IT/Innovation-related issues: The United States already has free trade 
agreements with 20 countries, and these should be updated.  More importantly, it 
should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and pursue other regional trade 
agreements with the goal of creating the desired rules of trade for cyber and 
IP/innovative sectors.  
• Investment:  The U.S. government already reviews inward investment for national security 
concerns.  It already reviews exports to ensure that sensitive technology is not sold to 
adversaries.  It would seem to make sense that when U.S. firms invest overseas that when 
a national security issue might arise that such investment also be reviewed to ensure 
sensitive technology is not transferred abroad. 
• Resilience:  Cyber-enable theft of IP and business confidential information, whether from 
China or other predators, remains a significant cost to business and a threat to the trading 
system.  Global supply chains remain vulnerable to disruption.  While governments can 
and must act to discourage predatory policies, business and government alike can help deter 
predatory practices (government or private) by reducing weaknesses in their digital 
ecosystems. 
• Engage and Challenge:  Given global cyber and economic links today, it is unrealistic to 
think that the United States and its allies should or could reduce engagement in either the 
                                                 
33 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 USC §1337. 
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digital domain or with China.  Indeed, the United States derives significant benefits from 
each in terms of trade, prices, jobs, consumer choice, and economic growth.  The United 
States therefore should remain engaged with China on cyber/IP/innovation issues and 
continue to press its concerns.  
 
One element of that dialogue should be to remind China that global trade is in part based 
on reciprocity.  “The GATT/WTO principle of reciprocity refers to the ideal of mutual changes in 
trade policy [in which] governments negotiate in GATT/WTO rounds with the stated goal of 
obtaining mutually advantageous arrangements through reciprocal reductions in tariff bindings.”34  
Given the importance of cyber/ICT/high tech to economies around the world, if left unchanged 
China’s policies invite others to adopt similar approaches.   
Beyond dialogue, governments and companies need not accept unfair or predatory 
treatment when it occurs.  Assuming there is a workable dispute settlement mechanism in place, it 
should be used, as the United States is doing with its WTO case against China’s technology 
licensing practices, both to determine if there are WTO violations and to establish an appropriate 
remedy.  If there are not applicable WTO disciplines, then the United States and like-minded allies 
should use available national tools for either redress or to encourage a change in the practices 
themselves. 
Conclusion 
“Protection is essentially a defensive measure, and in all struggles, in commerce as in war, 
it is not defensive action, but offensive…which ultimately wins.”35  Mahan’s analysis remains as 
correct today as a century ago.  A U.S. response that seeks to wall our firms and workers off from 
the competitive challenges posed by China and cyber is doomed to fail.  The United States would 
both fall farther behind competitively and lose its leadership of the global trading system. 
                                                 
34 Bagwell, Keith and Taiger, Robert W., The WTO:  Theory and Practice, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2009-
11, p. 19. 
35 Mahan, Retrospect and Prospect, in Retrospect and Prospect, p. 18. 
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As the United States looks to adapt to China and cyber, defense is important, and offense 
is critical.  Defensive measures that seek to limit the impact of cyber or Chinese policies and 
practices by closing access to the U.S. market may for a time succeed in reducing damage to parts 
of the U.S. economy.  Their focus should be narrowly-tailored to addressing harmful activities that 
the existing set of international trade rules is ill-equipped to remedy.  They are unlikely, however, 
to address the fundamental issue of sustaining and strengthening the global trading system that 
cyber has helped to broaden and deepen and on which the most dynamic, leading areas of the U.S. 
economy now depends. 
The United States therefore needs an offensive, or affirmative, strategy that seeks to shape 
the system and participant behavior in ways that build on U.S. values and strengths – promoting 
the free and fair exchange of goods, services and investment; allowing countries to trade on the 
basis on their comparative advantages and not on artificial strengths garnered through state 
direction and misdeeds; negotiating agreements that the changing nature of global commercial 
activity and updating those agreements regularly; enforcing negotiated commitments and, in turn, 
abiding by its own commitments; developing and strengthening alliances with like-minded 
partners to set global norms and obligations; and continuing to engage with adversaries so that 
they have a clear understanding of U.S. positions and the jeopardy they face if the system breaks 
down. 
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